Spearheaded by Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753, English marriage reform of the mid eighteenth century changed both the concept and practice of marriage. Indeed, it enabled marriage to become a pivot for new relations between government and the lives of citizens. This transformation was achieved not through sweeping legislative reform, nor by a usurpation of the church's traditional role in the formalization of weddings, but by a redefinition of the English marriage rite. The Marriage Act determined rules for the time, place, and registration of legal weddings, decreeing that the only valid form of English marriage was one "performed by an ordained priest according to the Anglican Liturgy in . . . the Established Church after thrice called banns or the purchase of a license from the bishop." In doing so it terminated an older, ecclesiastical marriage code for which marriage had been, in essence, an exchange of vows performed before two witnesses. This shift from marriage loosely defined as a speech act to marriage defined and regulated through strict ceremonial requirements and bureaucratic procedures hardened the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate marriages and narrowed the forms and social meanings of marriage per se. Whereas the nuptial practices of the aristocracy, rural workers, and urban wage earners, for instance, had varied widely
in style, tone, sites and purposes, after 1754, when the Hardwicke reforms took effect, the English marriage ceremony came more and more to represent a practical reiteration of governmental regulations that bound citizens to the nation-state.
That the Marriage Act relied upon strict points of ceremony and procedure to define the new national marriage code was not simply a mark of the expanding reach of the modernizing state. Viewed more broadly, the act was part of a larger interest in the minutiae of matrimonial rites and ceremonies and in the discourse of marriage that was a prominent feature of print culture. These interests were developed in a form of pre-anthropological theorizing (which I shall call "ethno-philosophy") that conceptualized matrimony and coupling as cornerstones for enlightened knowledge about mankind, and in a form of popular, often eroticized, writing appealing to the exotic (which I shall call the "marriage-rites genre"). It presented British readers with lively and detailed descriptions of marriage ceremonies and customs from around the globe.
This essay explores some of the links between the emerging popular interest in global marriage practices and the work of David Hume (and, implicitly, of other philosophers), who used those practices as a basis for conceptualizing the universal category "human nature." The essay thereby provides a fresh framework within which to view the Marriage Act's reforms. That the attempt to regularize English matrimony occurred in the wake of new interests in global marriage practices raises a number of important questions about the relationship between domestic legislative reform and the new global consciousness characteristic of enlightened thought. How does the Marriage Act's tendency to tie marriage and family relations more narrowly to English citizenship relate to the circulation of these cosmopolitan texts? To what extent did the focus on worldly marriage rites further the reform of unruly marriage practices at home, such as those celebrated at London's Fleet and other flourishing urban clandestine marriage markets? I shall argue that the interests and categories within marriage-rites literature helped normalize the Hardwicke Act's regularization of matrimony by setting English marriage within a frame of global difference and by providing the conditions through which the Act's requirements could be formulated as expressions of an enlightened national and imperial culture.
Ethno-Philosophy
Perhaps the key eighteenth-century text for global theorizations of marriage is Book 16 of Montesquieu's L'Esprit des lois (1748). It applied a theory of the influence of climate to the "laws of domestic slavery" to help explain the global variation in those laws. Montesquieu's mode of philosophical inquiry -peppered with cross-cultural anecdotes and observations borrowed from travel writers and historians -influenced, among others, David Hume. In the early 1740s, Hume wrote two essays on marriage. The second, "Of Polygamy and Divorces," a defence of European monogamy, begins paradoxically, As marriage is an engagement entered into by mutual consent, and has for its end the propagation of the species, it is evident, that it must be susceptible to all the variety of conditions, which consent establishes. . . . it is mere superstition to imagine, that marriage can be entirely uniform, and will admit only of one mode . . . Did not human laws restrain the natural liberty of men, every particular marriage would be as different as contracts or bargains of any other kind. 1 For Hume there are as many ways of being married as there are societies. As some of the essay's recent feminist and postcolonial commentators have noted, Hume goes on, however, to generate an imperialist typology of sex within which European indissoluble monogamy is an ideal contrasted with (Eastern) polygamy and older (Roman) practices of divorce. 2 What has remained unnoticed, however, is that in pressing his readers to imagine marriage in its historical and geographic diversity Hume implicitly asserts marriage's universality. The idea that marriage exists in all societies leads him to imagine cultural differences from which emerge universal cross-cultural stereotypes: "As circumstances vary, and the laws propose different advantages, we find, that, in different times and places, they impose different conditions on this important contract [marriage] . In Tonquin, it is usual for the sailors, when the ships come into harbour, to marry for the season; and notwithstanding this precarious engagement, they are assured . . . of the strictest fidelity to their bed . . . from those temporary spouses" (182).
It was unnecessary for Hume to venture as far as Tonquin, however, for a specimen of conjugal difference: at London's Fleet prison, for instance, English sailors regularly practiced group marriages while on shore leave, and His Majesty's Navy recognized Fleet marriages to the extent that a "temporary spouse" could claim her husband's wages in arrears in the event of his death. 3 Because they enabled soldiers, sailors, and urban wage earners to live outside monogamous matrimony, at least temporarily, until 1753 Fleet marriages were important to the production of an imperial labor force and to the growth of mercantile capital. Proposals for similar kinds of matrimonial heterodoxy were generated within the American colonies, where the concern to populate settlements led to suggestions for compulsory Creole marriages, systematized polygamy between male colonists and indigenous women (an arrangement that William Petty delicately called "California" marriage), 4 and the sanctioning of motherhood out of wedlock. 5 For Hume, however, it was by turning to Tonquin that domestic forms of nonmonogamous matrimony could be overlooked, which is how a norm of European consensual monogamy insinuated itself into that apparently benign universal ethnological category, marriage.
For Hume, cultural differences are not adequately explained by Montesquieu's naturalist model of climate change. Instead they are evidence for a global dynamics of feeling. Cultures do not reflect the physical world but are the effects of an interior moral sense that binds humans together into like-minded communities. In "Of the love of fame, " a chapter in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739 -40), Hume had come to recognize sympathy as a primary force that molded resemblance:
No quality of human nature is more remarkable . . . than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from . . . our own. . . . To this principle we ought to ascribe the great uniformity we may observe in the humours and turn of thinking of those of the same nation; and 'tis much more probable, that this resemblance arises from sympathy, than from any influence of the soil and climate. 6 Hume's analysis of sympathy leads toward a nation-bound conception of culture. For him, national culture is an elemental and local expression of a universal moral sense. As recent accounts of eighteenth-century theories of sensibility attest, the dynamics of sympathy are double-edged, even indeterminate in their effects. 7 For Hume sympathy can both account for national differences and, as a universal, potentially transcend or transform them. The paradoxes of Humean sympathy, and of moral sentiment per se, provide the blueprint for a new philosophical and ethnographic construction of marriage customs that lends itself to being an expression of human Popular Ethnography and Enlightened Imperialism diversity and a marker of national and cultural identity within an essential human sameness.
To put these observations into perspective, it is useful to turn to Hume's essay "Of Love and Marriage, " published in 1741 between the Treatise and "Of Polygamy and Divorces." This essay presents an entirely different evaluation of marriage: it is based on the idea that one chooses whether to marry and is couched in the rhetoric of badinage between the sexes:
I have often had thoughts of complying with . . . the fair sex and writing a panegyric upon marriage: But, in looking around for materials, they seemed to be of so mixed a nature, that at the conclusion of my reflections, I found that I was as much disposed to write a satyr, which might be placed on the opposite pages of the panegyric. And I am afraid, that as satyr is, on most occasions, thought to contain more truth than panegyric, I should have done their cause more harm than good by this expedient. . . . I must be more a friend to truth, than even to them, where their interests are opposite. (Essays, 558) Compare this playful admission of the sad "truth" of marital ambiguity with his account, a year later, of universal male conjugal duty in "Of Polygamy and Divorces": "A man, in conjoining himself to a woman, is bound to her according to the terms of his engagement: In begetting children, he is bound, by all the ties of nature and humanity, to provide for their subsistence and education. When he has performed these two parts of duty, no one can reproach him with injustice or injury" (181).
The two essays seem to inhabit different epistemic spheres -so much so that in 1760 Hume withdrew "Of Love and Marriage" from publication, which made "Of Polygamy and Divorces" his definitive statement on the marriage question. In the shift from "Of Love and Marriage" to "Of Polygamy and Divorces, " a contingent, unfixed, and inherently dialogic marriage relation is reconfigured within universalist and strictly procreative terms. This strictly functional idea of marriage is allied to the Hardwicke legislation's eradication of clandestine weddings to make way for the installation of a new, fully codified marriage law at the centre of the English state, thus underpinning marriage's increasing ideological power and categorical force across the period.
As traditional conceptions of man and his place within a divine cosmology were challenged by naturalist philosophy, a new concept of the social emerged wherein marriage functions as the fundamental unit. Put simply, within enlightened secular theories of the social, it becomes mar-riage's job to reconcile the forces of "nature" and "the passions" to the requirements of civil society. Again, Hume's thinking is exemplary. In "Of the amorous passion, or love betwixt the sexes," another chapter in the Treatise, Hume categorized the love between men and women as one of those "compound passions." What is problematic to Hume is the "force and violence" of sexual attraction. Love, he says, "in its most natural state, is deriv'd from the conjunction of three different impressions or passions, viz. the pleasing sensation arising from beauty; the bodily appetite for generation; and a generous kindness or good-will" (441). He goes on to explain the delicate and complex chemistry by which aesthetic taste mediates between and reconciles lust and a sense of morality: "Kindness or esteem, and the appetite to generation, are too remote to unite easily together. The one is, perhaps, the most refin' d passion of the soul; the other the most gross and vulgar. The love of beauty is plac' d in a just medium betwixt them, and partakes of both their nature: From whence it proceeds, that 'tis so singularly fitted to produce both" (442 -43).
But for beauty and aesthetic sense, human beings would be constitutionally divided between their social and sexual natures. 8 Given the precarious balance that constitutes love, it is perhaps no surprise that Hume could theorize two different ontologies of marriage. What reconciles the otherwise conflicting logic of Hume's two marriage essays is an overriding construction of marriage as the social equivalent of the aesthetic sense -that is, as an integrative principle that maps social living onto a mosaic of compound drives and passions that constitute a human nature that is both "refined" and "vulgar." 9 In marriage a social drive and a reproductive sexuality purportedly common to all adult members of the species intersect, but paradoxically marriage can be both a potential site of cleavage (as in "Of Love and Marriage") and a universal institution subject to local variations (as in "Of Polygamy and Divorces"). As we'll see, these are the powerful philosophemes within which marriage developed its uniquely modern profile as an axiomatic social-sexual relation, and within which a particular companionate, monogamous strain of matrimony becomes central to the ideas of state, nation, and empire that were imagined and instantiated across the eighteenth century.
It is valuable to move past Hume into the twentieth century just for a moment, in order to appreciate the extent of Enlightenment ethnophilosophy's legacy. In twentieth-century theory the universalist theorization of matrimony reaches its apotheosis in Claude Lévi-Strauss's struc-turalist anthropology. In The Elementary Structures of Kinship (1949) , Lévi-Strauss extends and revises the anthropological investigation of reciprocity with his "discovery" of marriage as the "universal, permanent, and basic structure" from which all other relations of exchange follow. 10 For him, as for Hume in "Of Polygamy and Divorces," it is impossible to imagine a social world without marriage, a world for which marriage is a contingent rather than an essential element of human culture. Marriage is, as he puts it, "a necessary condition of society" (136). 11 Most tellingly, as he notes at the conclusion of his study, marriage and language are functionally twinned, parallel systems of exchange, or universal structures, which, as such, never intersect. 12 Notwithstanding the structuralist work that this observation has triggered, in itself it would seem to posit mutually exclusive realms of sexual praxis and symbolic representation at a time when it has become necessary to problematize the separation of these terms and, in particular, to chart their modern development within a legalistic, stable matrimonial code that understands itself to be disarticulated from speech acts. By analyzing marriage as a function of kinship structures, and by arguing that these structures are an originary form of signification itself, Lévi-Strauss, and the tradition of anthropology which stems from him, effectively relegates marriage to an ontologically firm ground of relations of kinship, family, and sexual reproduction that remains separate from the more labile and casual practices, often dependent upon a simple speech act, that characterised them even in pre-Hardwicke England.
The Marriage-Rites Genre
When Hume turned his mind to marriage in 1742, he felt it was necessary to dispel his readers' "superstitions" of marriage's "uniformity." Yet it was not as if he or his contemporaries lacked knowledge about other cultures' marriage practices. Since the late seventeenth century the marriage-rites genre had been a popular form of anthropological writing. It had developed out of the Renaissance tradition of cosmography, writing that had served to introduce European readers to the customs and manners of the peoples of the world. The genre consists of collections of customs and manners that focused exclusively upon marriage. The material ranged from bland descriptions of the minutiae of wedding ceremonies and courtship procedures to commentary that reproduced received ideas about other worldly forms of sexuality. English versions of the genre, for instance, talked of the amorousness of the French, the hot-blooded passions of the Italians and the Spanish, and the despotism of the polygamous Turks. The genre also disseminated new, and often spurious, knowledge about the world beyond Europe and the East: the savage/pagan marriage rites of the North American "Indians" were a subject of special interest, as were those of the native Africans. The Hottentot marriage ceremony, for instance, reportedly involving the officiating priest urinating on the bride and groom, was a genre set piece from the mid eighteenth century.
The marriage-rites genre is an important if neglected source for a range of recurrent, cross-cultural nuptial tropes that circulated very broadly in eighteenth-century Britain -from the Grub Street milieu in which the genre surfaced, to the work of such philosophers as Montesquieu, Hume, and John Millar, as well as within periodical journalism, conduct literature, and commercial stage spectacles. At the very least, the genre is an early example of the cross-culturalism that Hume takes up in his theorizations of marriage and sympathy as human universals. And it offers important clues about the limitations of these universals as they operate outside the domain of the human sciences. For here, at the level of popular or vernacular culture, the fascination of worldly conjugal practices is presented not in epistemological terms but as a form of curiosity. 13 Not that we should take this at face value. It is hard to suppose that readers of the genre were simply curious: these texts -part ethnography, part pornography, part satire -played on powerful forms of desire and mastery. Most obviously, the rites of marriage were elaborated in reference to the sex acts for which they became metonymies; and matrimonial differences, which marked the boundaries of European monogamy for Hume, were transformed into an explicitly eroticized and exoticized measure of English marriages. This helps to resituate the concept of sympathy that Hume posits as the affective connection across what we would call cultural difference, suggesting that sympathy can be understood as a sublimation of the heterosexual eroticism through which the marriage-rites genre helped to draw late seventeenth-and early eighteenth-century readers into print culture itself.
The It is perhaps no surprise that it is within early travel writing and ethnographic discourse that marriage first emerges in its enlightened guise as a universal category of human experience. The crucial difference between De Gaya's theorization of marriage and Hume's, however, is that De Gaya's remains tied to a traditional emphasis upon religions, not geopolitical entities, as the primary frame for the classification of man. 17 This aside, both Hume and De Gaya assert the global status of matrimony -but whereas marriage's universality was implicit in Hume, here it is directly stated. Perhaps this is because, for De Gaya, the universal status of marriage was not so much a truth claimed about mankind as an effective basis for the publication of ethnographic studies pitched at a broad audience. Only after Nuptial Ceremonies did descriptions of matrimonial ceremonies begin to be published independent of general accounts of human culture in which they had appeared earlier (Hodgen, 172 -73). To put the point bluntly, the focus upon marriage ceremonies and the birth of the marriage-rites genre is to be considered as an aspect of the expansion of mercantile and print capital in the late seventeenth century. Not only did the genre's blending of the exotic and the erotic have enormous commercial appeal, it also had longterm viability as an endeavor to document the conjugal curiosities uncovered across Europe's expanding imperial frontier. As De Gaya notes in his conclusion: "Having performed my task (gentle reader) and, as I hope, in part contented thy Curosity [sic] about these Nuptial Ceremonies; a part of which I have been Witness to, & of others have received credible Informations from sundry grave Authors and Travellers" (Matrimonial Customs
[1687], 104). Marriage as a principle of diversity and unity; curiosity aroused yet only "in part" contented; exotic rites and ceremonies both eyewitnessed and "credibly" received -these are the incomplete, contingent terms of closure that get taken up again and again in the many translations, reissues, revisions, and imitations of De Gaya's text over the next two centuries.
The most important of these was Brown's translation, which was still circulating in the late nineteenth century under the apparently winsome title
Matrimonial Ceremonies Displayed: Wherein are exhibited the various customs, odd pranks, whimsical tricks and surprising practices of near one hundred different kingdoms and peoples in the world, now used in the celebration and consummation of matrimony, collected from the papers of a A Rambling
Batchelor (London, 1886). As this retitling suggests, Brown set out to stim- ulate sexual curiosity. His prefatory "Remarks" quipped, "Marriage being the Port, or Haven, at which most of the Sons and Daughters of Eve design to touch, sooner or later; 'tis no wonder that People are universally curious to know how this ticklish Ceremony is perform'd in other Countries" (1) . By innuendo marriage is made coterminous with coitus, both of which are exotic ports to be explored vicariously. Brown intensified these playful, quasi-pornographic modes of readerly engagement by appending bawdy footnotes, humorous "animadversions," and satiric essays to De Gaya's original text. 18 The result was commercial success: Marriage Ceremonies was published in three editions between 1697 and 1704; and the text resurfaced in 1744 and again in 1748 in a fourth edition that circulated over the next two decades. This midcentury resurgence confirms that a popular interest in marriage rites coincided with writings on marriage by Hume just before the Marriage Act reforms.
More importantly, perhaps, between the original flush of Brown's imprints and their resurgence in the 1740s, the marriage-rites genre had begun to perform ideological work for a distinctly English nationalism and imperialism. As evidence that the French understood the genre in these terms, one might cite the 1750 French translation of Brown (Geneva) , in which the publisher ignored De Gaya, preferring instead to identify the work's Englishness -its dangerously eroticized gaze, no less -which required careful editing to accommodate "le bon gôut & la pudeur" of French readers (qtd. in Boyce, 56). An English effort to reform and elevate the genre had already begun amongst Brown's imitators at home. As early as 1724, Thomas Salmon produced a new strain of the genre purged of eroticism, and aiming to present global marriage rites within the frame of moral pedagogy. Salmon's Critical Essay Concerning Marriage appended its catalogue of rites to a high-minded selection of moral essays, marriage advice, and explanatory material on matrimonial law. 19 It also initiated an important methodological shift by replacing religion with nationality as the primary frame for classifying marriage's diversity. Salmon's readers were introduced to the nuptial rites of Europeans -the Poles, the Danes, the Germans, and so on -followed by Asians -East India, Ceylon, Siam, Tonquin, and so on -and finally Africans and Americans. These geopolitical divisions are the terms within which the genre goes on to reproduce an imperialist ethnography of marriage for which English masculinity and femininity and English statist, consensual, monogamous marriage are hypercivilized global exempla.
Here is one brief example. In 1760 "Uxorius" 20 This exemplifies how the genre shifted away from ethno-satire toward a celebration of Englishness that aims to stabilize gender relations in consensual monogamy. Uxorious's presentation of English femininity as a benchmark of civility recodes the genre's earlier eroticism around tropes of British global mastery. 21 And within this feminization of the genre the trope of curiosity, so important to De Gaya and Brown, was disavowed within claims of moral pedagogy. Salmon makes the standard Horatian claim to teach and delight (A4), and a century later Lady Augusta Hamilton declared in Marriage Rites, Customs, and Ceremonies, of all Nations of the Universe, "Whatever might give offence to delicacy has . . . been as much as possible avoided -the object being not to inflame the passions, but to render the thirst of curiosity subservient to the ends of rational enjoyment and the Christian character." 22 These changes, rather conveniently, also had enabled the genre to address more openly an important new demographic, the female reader.
It is worth noting some of the ways in which the genre became both feminized and diversified within the late eighteenth century's expanded cultural marketplace: marriage rites were a popular, semiregular fixture both in the Lady's Magazine -which had an enormous circulation -and on the commercial stage. The most popular Covent Garden pantomime of the 1780s and 1790s, for instance, was The Choice of Harlequin, or The Indian Chief (1781), which touted itself as an "exact representation of the procession of an Eastern Marriage." It featured some three hundred players and a bridegroom-prince "magnificently habited, seated on an elephant . . . and smoking a hubble-bubble." 23 Here the genre was spectacularized so as to make good on its promise to display marriage ceremonies. Indeed The Choice of Harlequin drew upon the whole armoury of special effects crucial to the late-century stage's attempts to increase its audience while at the same time representing culturally specific and authentic materials about other peoples in such a way as to underscore the cosmopolitanism and technical sophistication of British culture. 24 As we have just seen, by the early nineteenth century, the marriagerites genre was able to accommodate a female signature. Lady Hamilton's Marriage Rites repeated a great deal of her predecessors' material, but it also included information gathered during Cook's voyages and subsequent missionary journeys to the South Pacific: the marriage practices of the Tahitian and Tongan natives in particular provided a new emphasis on infanticide and what Hamilton calls female "unchastity" (381). Hamilton was diligent in her documentation of the latest "conjugal discoveries," as she termed them, in both "the African and American interiors" and the Antipodes (v). Her account closes with a touching assurance to British readers that the rites of the Church of England were firmly established at Botany Bay (390). Hamilton's text was, in fact, the most global of all surveys of marriage to that time; and to mark her achievement she boldly declared that "the British pair would be placed on the highest pedestals in a temple consecrated to the conjugal duties and virtues" (3). This expression of matrimonial triumphalism returns us to the philosophical claims about the universal status of marriage with which we began.
Indeed, Lady Hamilton's hyperbole reminds us of how far the marriage-rites genre had developed from its earliest forms, which seem simply to have aimed to stimulate curiosity. That curiosity was sexualized and it had a particular relationship to the philosophical theorizations of marriage and cultural difference that were so important to the emergence of universalist Enlightenment thought. It returned those theorizations to a basis in sexual desire and erotic fascination and thereby was able to commodify and popularise representations of global cultural differences. As we have seen, by Hamilton's time these representations were firmly inserted into narratives of British progress, civilization, and empire. And this was even more the case in 1847, when Lorenzo Niles Fowler published Marriage: Its History and Ceremonies; with a Phrenological and Physiological Exposition of the Functions and Qualifications for Happy Marriages. 25 Here the savage marriage rites of the American and Pacific native peoples form the basis of a conjectural history of matrimony that posits New World primitivism as a crucial link between Britain's present and mankind's past. Fowler also locates the monogamous impulse within an implicitly racialized model of human physiognomy. 26 Not surprisingly his exemplary specimen of monogamous humanity was Queen Victoria herself (104).
We can now return to Hume and the enlightened philosophical account of marriage. As we have seen, Hume posited universal marriage as the grounding for a theory of human variety, thereby losing sight of marriage's heterogeneous and contingent meanings. But the marriage-rites genre, from its beginnings to its moralized, quasi-scientific incarnations of the mid nineteenth century, turned on a simpler logic. It collapsed the exotic into the erotic so as to place British readers and their marriage practices at the world's centre. Comparison with other practices, then, seemed to legitimate British superiority. Yet unlike the philosophers' marriage, the marriage of this popular, commercial genre did communicate some sense of the variety and otherness of marriage and, thus, of global cultures in broader terms. It may well be, as I have implied, that in his essays Hume tacitly assumed that his readers were familiar with marital variety from reading the popular genre, and that they used that familiarity to displace a history of nuptial heterogeneity at home; but for him (as for his heir, Lévi-Strauss), marriage finally speaks of a single human nature, not of the messy mix of cultural difference. 9. This claim can be filled out by making reference to Treatise, book 3, sect. 2, "Of the Origin of Justice and Property, " where Hume makes the connection between amorous passion, marriage, and the formation of the social via considerations about property. The essay's opening passages posit the "natural appetite betwixt the sexes" as the "first and original principle of human society"; yet later we are told that the "passion of interest" is the "first and most natural movement" of human nature, so that the "convention for the distinction of property and for the stability of possession, is of all circumstances the most necessary to the establishment of human society" (538, 543, 543). We might reasonably ask how these competing "first" principles relate to each other. The answer is that sex leads to marriage, which secures the inheritance of property and the stability of its possession. But Hume himself does not explicitly state marriage's connective role. It remains a central yet elided term for the essay, fraught with some of the contradictions it embodies in his two marriage essays. The problem is perpetuated by modern commentators such as Jordanova, who refers in passing to "Of the Origin of Justice and Property" as Hume's consideration of the "central role of sex and the family in the formation of society" (166). By reproducing the essay's conflation of a naturalized notion of "sex" with "family, " Jordanova's description repeats its erasure of marriage.
Notes
10. Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship, trans. J. Harle Bell and J. R. von Sturmer (Boston: Beacon, 1969), 136 -37. For Lévi-Strauss, marriage is "the condition upon which reciprocity is realized" and "the archetype of exchange" (488, 483). For him, as for Hume, marriage represents the cusp of the domains of the social and the sexual, their inseparability. As such it is also the institution that marks the distinction between these domains. Lévi-Strauss famously states: "Marriage is thus a dramatic encounter between nature and culture" (489). In this double capacity, marriage's position within the history of the human sciences would seem to be pertinent to Judith Butler's efforts to rethink the psychoanalytic tendency to posit a phantasmic, presocial state before the law, and to reformulate the incest taboo in Foucauldian terms -that is, in both its juridical and its generative functions (Gender Paul, 1929 and 1932) . In the 1929 foreword, Malinowski announced the replacement of marriage with sex as a key term for anthropological enquiry, and the title of the text was intended to promote the "rehabilitation" of that "indispensable and misused" term, sexual, and to mark the end of "marriage" as a "puritanical euphemism" for the "facts of life" (xlv, xxxiii). In a defense of his efforts that reads like an unconscious explication of the repressive hypothesis, Malinowski argued that sex took its "widest meaning . . . rather as a sociological and cultural force than a mere bodily relation of two individuals." "Sex is not a mere physiological transaction . . . it becomes the nucleus of such venerable institutions as marriage and the family; it pervades art and it produces its spells and its magic. It dominates in fact almost every aspect of culture" (xlv).
Malinowski's rehabilitation of the term sexual is, of course, one of the ways in which he marks a decisive break between his own functionalist, field-work-focused method of procedure (based upon an emphatically empirical and synchronic model of anthropological enquiry) and the older evolutionist models that had dominated the discipline. Inquiry into the history and origins of marriage was the favorite subject of the conjectural histories produced within nineteenth-century evolutionary models of human history, as in Lewis Henry Morgan, . Certainly we can think of Lévi-Strauss as rescuing marriage from Malinowski's attempt to subsume it under the sign of sex. For him, marriage, as the primary mechanism of exchange, represents a dimension of the social that is not reducible to the sexual, however broadly it is cast. At the same time he entirely rejects the speculative historical method of evolutionary accounts of marriage and kinship, asserting instead "the universal permanent basic structure of marriage" (136 -37). This being said, we need to note that Lévi-Strauss's formulation of marriage begins to pull away from its automatic alignment with sex and family. In his essay "The Family, " he posits the "great game of marriage" as a principle of human social life that exists in a relation of opposition, tension, and dependence upon the family (Claude Levi-Strauss, The View from Afar, trans. Joachim Neugroschel and Phoebe Hoss [New York: Basic Books, 1985], 61). Here Lévi-Strauss insists that his negative formulation of the family's universality (i.e., the incest taboo/exchange of women) is not problematized by nonfamilial forms of marriage (e.g., the impermanent marriage ties of the Nayar, 41) or same-sex marriages among upper-caste women in some parts of Africa. For him, these practices exist at one end of a scale of a more or less present universality of the family (50). It is precisely around the issue of this essay's shifting, ambivalent relation to anthropological assertions of the family's universality that a space for my argument opens up: the universality of the family is displaced by the universality of marriage as the social process of exchange through which the natural processes of filiation can be carried on. That is, the argument works by inversion, making a case for "the social dependence of the natural order" rather than vice versa (54).
12. Rubin comments, "The ubiquity and adaptive effectiveness of kinship has led many anthropologists to consider its invention, along with the invention of language, to have been the developments which decisively marked the discontinuity between semi-hominids and human beings" ("Traffic, " 170). 14. The original advertisements for the 1697 edition do not mention a translator (Benjamin Boyce, Brown of Facetious Memory [Cambridge: Harvard Univ., 1939], 55 n. 19). Boyce comments, "That Brown was responsible for the entire volume the title page does not clearly indicate, but a contemporary reference to it implies that he was" (77). After De Gaya's original preface, the second edition of 1698 included Brown's "Remarks Upon the Ensuing Treatise, " which were acknowledged as Brown's on the title page. Boyce notes that Brown's "Remarks" were probably issued separately in the
